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Abstract
We study the effect of entrepreneurs’ wealth allocations on their firm level
capital structure by using a sample of small privately owned firms from the 2003
Surveys of Small Business Finance. We find that financial leverage decreases as
entrepreneurs allocate more wealth on their firm investments. We also find that
wealth allocation only affects capital structure in limited liability firms. Lastly, we
show that the effect of wealth allocation on capital structure does not disappear
after adjusting for collateral and personal guarantees.
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I.

Introduction
Capital structure is one of the most important issues in corporate finance

because it leads to the firm’s valuation and its cost of capital. Extant empirical
literature has focused primarily on publicly traded firms. However, according to
Kobe (2007), small privately owned firms account for about 50% of non-farm real
GDP and 50% of the job growth in the period from 1998 to 2004. Although small
privately owned firms are a critical part of the overall economy, their capital
structure is a relatively under-explored issue in literature.
Moreover, according to Girard (2009), under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) granted by Congress, the U.S. government has
spent more than $1.6 trillion dollars bailing out big business, such as AIG, Citi,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. However, small businesses, as an important part of
the overall economy, are also facing credit constraints. It is important for us to
pay serious attention to small businesses. Research on the capital structure
determinants in these firms is desirable because capital structure affects cost of
capital, which eventually affects the survival and growth of small privately owned
firms.
Extant literature has attempted to explain the observed capital structure as
a result of bankruptcy costs, tax shields, adverse selection, and agency conflicts.
However, few studies have examined the link between firms’ capital structure
decisions and their decision-makers’ personal wealth allocations. Entrepreneurs
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(principal owners1) in private firms own significant portions of their firms and
face fewer governance constraints. Thus their tolerance of losing their firm
investments might play a significant role in determining the amounts of financial
leverage2 on the firm level. In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature
by studying the effect of decision makers’ wealth allocations on firm-level capital
structure.
Entrepreneurs tend to have a significant portion of their personal wealth
invested in their firms, which could be lost in the event of bankruptcy. Thus the
allocation of entrepreneurs’ wealth invested in their firms relative to other
investments can affect their incentives to borrow at the firm level. When firms are
incorporated and have limited liability, the personal wealth that entrepreneurs
(principal owners) allocate outside of the firms is protected from the claims of
firms’ creditors in case of bankruptcy. As entrepreneurs allocate larger
proportions of their wealth outside of their firms, they have more incentives to use
financial leverage at the firm level because their loss is smaller in case of
bankruptcy. In contrast, the larger the proportions of entrepreneurs’ wealth
invested in their firms, the lower the incentives they have to use financial leverage
because of the greater loss in case of bankruptcy. Thus, we hypothesize that, in
limited liability firms, firm-level financial leverage is negatively correlated with
the entrepreneurs’ proportional wealth invested in their firms. We focus on
limited liability firms rather than all small privately owned firms because we do
not expect a wealth allocation effect in unlimited liability firms. In unlimited

1
2

In this paper, principal owner refers to the largest shareholder of the firm.
Financial leverage is defined as the ratio of total debts to total assets in this paper.
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liability firms, both decision makers’ firm investments and out-of-firms assets are
subject to the claims of firms’ creditors in case of firm bankruptcy. Thus, their
total wealth is tied to the firms.
The 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance (SSBF) provides
information on both firm-level capital structure and firm decision-makers’
personal wealth. We test our hypothesis by using data on limited liability firms
from SSBF 2003 and find results consistent with our prediction. With limited
liability protection, firms tend to use more financial leverage as the entrepreneurs
allocate more wealth outside of their firms. This result remains unchanged after
we adjust our measure of wealth allocation by the amount of loans that
entrepreneurs obtain by using personal guarantees or out-of-firm personal assets
as collateral. As a robustness test, we also test our hypothesis on a larger sample
that includes both limited liability firms and unlimited liability firms. Consistent
with our hypothesis, we find that wealth allocation only affects the capital
structure of limited liability firms. Moreover, our tests show that wealth allocation
does not play a significant role in determining the capital structure of unlimited
liability firms.
We contribute to the literature by studying an under-explored issue, which
is the relation between entrepreneurs’ wealth allocations and their firm-level
capital structure. Compared to Cole (2008), we show that wealth allocation, which
has been previously almost ignored in the literature, plays an important role in
determining capital structure in privately owned firms that have limited liability.
Mueller (2008) suggests that financial leverage increases as entrepreneurs invest
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more wealth in their firms because of higher cost of equity. Our analysis offers an
alternative hypothesis. We present evidence that is consistent with our prediction.
We further differentiate our work from Mueller’s by showing that wealth
allocation only affects capital structure when firms have limited liability. Our data
sample is more representative of the population because we include the book
insolvent firms that account for 16% of the total firms. In addition, we control for
the fact that 16% of the SSBF 2003 firms are constrained in obtaining credits.

II.

Literature Review
Modern capital structure theory begins with the work of Modigliani and

Miller (1958) on capital structure irrelevancy. They suggest that in the absence of
corporate taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, and information asymmetry,
capital structure does not have any effect on market the value of a firm.
In Modigliani and Miller’s framework, investors and firms have equal
access to financial markets. Investors can invest in either a levered firm or an
unlevered firm. If they invest in the unlevered firm, they can borrow the same
amount of money at the same cost of capital that the levered firm does. The
levered cash flows the investors receive are not different from those they receive
if they invest in the unlevered firm. Consequently, the value of the levered firm is
not different from the value of the unlevered one.
By relaxing the assumptions in the Modigliani and Miller framework,
several alternative capital structure theories have been developed. For example,
when corporate tax is added to the capital structure irrelevancy framework,
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Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggest that firms should use 100% debt financing
because the use of debt financing provides firms with tax shields. Additionally,
when both corporate tax and bankruptcy costs exist, Kraus and Litzenberger
(1973) suggest that there is an optimal leverage level for the firm when the
marginal benefit of tax shields is equal to the marginal expected deadweight costs
of bankruptcy (i.e., the trade-off theory). The deadweight costs of bankruptcy
refer to trustee fees, legal fees, and other costs of reorganization or liquidation
that bankrupt firms must absorb. The probability of bankruptcy increases as firms
use more financial leverage. When financial leverage is low, tax shields are more
valuable to firms than expected deadweight bankruptcy costs. However, as
financial leverage increases, expected deadweight bankruptcy costs increase at a
higher rate than the benefit of tax shields does. At equilibrium, the optimal capital
structure of the firm is achieved when the marginal benefit of tax shields is equal
to the marginal expected deadweight bankruptcy costs.
Myers and Majluf (1984) propose an adverse selection model that adds
information asymmetry to the capital structure irrelevancy proposition. In their
framework, managers know better about the true values of their firms than
outsiders. Moreover, managers act in the best interest of the existing shareholders.
Myers and Majluf show that managers issue equity only when they believe that
their firms are overvalued by the market. However, rational outside investors
interpret the new issue of equity as a negative signal and discount firms’ values
accordingly. Thus, outside financing sometimes becomes so expensive that the
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firms have to pass up some positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects.
Consequently, managers prefer to use retained earnings when they invest.
Based on the Myers and Majluf’s model, Myers (1984) suggests that there
is a pecking order when firms decide their capital structures. Firms first use their
retained earnings, then debt, and then equity (the pecking order theory). Generally
firms prefer to use retained earnings because internal financing can avoid
information asymmetry problems. Outside equity is the most expensive financing
option because of adverse selection. Myers and Majluf’s original model does not
formally examine the role of debt. However, Myers argues that debt financing
should fall between internal financing and equity financing because debtholders
can claim the firms’ residuals before shareholders in case of default. Therefore,
the cost of debt is lower than the cost of equity.
In addition to the above research, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose a
model in which agency conflicts exist not only between managers and
shareholders, but also between shareholders and debtholders (agency theory).
Under agency theory, owner-managers who do not own 100% of the equity will
consume perks at the expense of other shareholders. When owner-managers use
outside equity financing, monitoring costs occur as a result of the conflict of
interest between the owner-managers and outside shareholders. Outside
shareholders are rational and pay the prices for the shares that reflect the
monitoring costs. Therefore, owner-managers prefer internal financing to outside
equity financing. An agency problem also exists between shareholders and
debtholders if owner-managers act primarily on behalf of shareholders. Before
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new debt is issued, owner-managers promise to invest in low risk projects. After
they issue debt, they have incentives to replace the low-risk projects with the
high-risk projects. Only shareholders benefit from the high-risk projects’ payoffs
in good states of the economy. However, debtholders share the costs of the highrisk projects’ losses in bad states. Rational debtholders realize this agency conflict
and include various covenants in the indenture provisions to limit shareholders’
behavior, which reduces the value of the debt. Thus owner-managers prefer
internal financing to debt financing.
Agency theory does not predict a sequence between debt financing and
equity financing because the relative importance of the above two agency
conflicts is unclear. Notwithstanding, we can argue that the firm’s capital
structure depends on which agency cost is higher. However, the agency costs are
dynamic factors rather than fixed ones. The agency cost of debt increases as firms
use more financial leverage. In contrast, the agency cost of equity per dollar
decreases as firms use more financial leverage. The underlying rationale is that
the fixed payoffs promised by debt financing show the owner-managers’
confidence about their firms and send positive signals to the potential outside
shareholders. Thus, as debt financing increases, the incentive to use equity
financing also increases. The capital structure is optimal when the two agency
conflicts balance.
The above theories have empirical implications for a number of crosssectional variables that could be related to financial leverage. The trade-off theory
implies a positive relation between leverage and firm size because larger firms are
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more diversified and have lower default risk. The pecking order theory has
ambiguous inferences on the relation between leverage and firm size. One
argument is that larger firms face lower adverse selection and lower cost of debt.
However, firm size can also be a proxy for sizable retained earnings. Larger firms
tend to have more retained earnings and thus can use more retained earnings to
finance projects. Therefore, the relation between leverage and firm size can be
either positive or negative under the pecking-order theory. Under agency theory,
one can argue that larger firms have better reputations and lower agency cost of
debt. Furthermore, it is more likely that mangers in larger firms own smaller
percentages of the firms and have more incentives to consumer perks. Thus the
agency cost of equity is higher in larger firms. Therefore, it implies a positive
relation between leverage and firm size.
The trade-off theory also suggests that leverage should be negatively
related to growth options because higher growth firms lose more of their value
when these firms are financially distressed. However, the pecking order theory
has an ambiguous prediction on the relation between leverage and growth options.
Leverage could be positively related to growth options because high growth firms
have more investments and accumulate more debt over time holding profitability
constant. Nevertheless, one can also argue that firms with higher growth tend to
have more information asymmetry and higher cost of debt. According to agency
theory, it is easier for owner-managers in high growth firms to replace low-risk
projects with high-risk projects. It is also more difficult for debtholders in high
growth firms to monitor this substitution behavior. Rational debtholders realize
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the agency conflicts and discount the value of debt. As a result, agency theory
implies a negative relation between leverage and growth options.
In perspective, the trade-off theory suggests that profitable firms should
use more debt because they have lower expected bankruptcy costs. The pecking
order theory implies a negative relation between leverage and profitability
because profitable firms have more retained earnings and use less debt financing,
when we hold dividend policy constant. Agency theory does not yield a clear
inference on the relation between leverage and profitability.
Firms with tangible assets tend to lose less value when they are financially
distressed. Consequently, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relation between
leverage and tangible assets. Under the pecking order theory, firms with more
tangible assets have fewer information asymmetry problems and lower cost of
debt and lower cost of equity. Thus, the pecking order theory has an ambiguous
prediction on the relation between leverage and tangible assets. Agency theory
implies that financial leverage is positively related to tangible assets because
tangible assets make it difficult for owner-managers to replace low-risk projects
with high-risk ones.
Empirical research has examined extensively the above capital structure
theories using cross-sectional data on publicly traded firms. For example, Smith
and Watts (1992) study the correlation between financing policy (financial
leverage) and the investment opportunity set (growth options) using annual
Compustat data for the period 1976-1981. They construct five variables to proxy
for the investment opportunity set including book-to-market ratio; depreciation-
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to-firm value ratio; research and development (R&D) to firm value ratio; variance
of return on investment; a dummy variable for regulation; earnings to price ratio;
and capital expenditures to value ratio. A negative relation is found between these
measures for the firm’s investment opportunity set and its financial leverage level.
Their evidence supports the inference of agency theory that firms’ investment
opportunity set determines financing policies.
Additionally, Frank and Goyal (2007) examine U.S. firms on annual
Compustat data for the period from 1950 to 2003. They use four alternative
measures of leverage including: the ratio of total debt to market value of assets;
the ratio of total debt to book value of assets; the ratio of long term debt to market
value of assets; and the ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets. In their
linear regression model, a leverage measure at year t is the dependent variable.
The right-hand side of the estimation model is a vector of lagged independent
variables at year t-1: including profitability (ratio of operating income before
depreciation to total assets); firm size (log of total assets); tangible assets (ratio of
net property, plant, and equipment to total assets); and growth options (market to
book ratio).
Frank and Goyal find that leverage is positively related to tangible assets
and firm size, but negatively related to growth options and profitability. Their
results are consistent even when they use different measures of leverage. The
authors’ conclusion is that these results support the trade-off theory. The
coefficient of profitability is the only one that has a different sign than implied by
the trade-off theory. Thus, they argue that profitability can also be a better proxy
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for growth options than the market-to-book ratio. In such a case, the negative
coefficient captures the effect of growth options on leverage predicted by the
trade-off theory. An alternative explanation of their results is the sticky dividend
policy. If profitable firms choose to keep the earnings and pay dividends later,
then the leverage ratio can be lower because the equity is higher holding total
debts constant.
Cole (2008) provides the first empirical evidence on the capital structure
decisions of privately owned firms. He uses data from the 1987, 1993, 1998, and
2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances (SSBF). He defines the following
variables: (a) leverage as the ratio of total loans to total assets or the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets; (b) firm size as the natural log of total assets; (c) tangible
assets as the sum of inventory and property, plant and equipment3 divided by total
assets; (d) profitability as the ratio of profit after tax to total assets; (e) growth
options measured by dummy variables for positive and negative employment
growth during the previous three years; (f) liquidity defined as cash divided by
total assets; (g) firm age defined as the log of the firm’s age in years; (h) number
of commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions from which the firm
obtains financial services; (i) firm credit-worthiness (whether the firm has been
delinquent 60 days or more on a business obligation, and whether the firm has
made payments on a trade credit account late during the past fiscal year); (j) the
firm’s tax filing status (C-corporations, S-corporations, LLC, LLP, Partnership, or
Proprietorship); (k) limited liability protection; (l) the owner’s demographic

3

Property, plant and equipment is only available in SSBF 1987 (data item RIV_A11). This
variable is not available in SSBF 1993, 1998, and 2003.

12

information (gender and race); and (m) industry effects (whether the firm is in a
specific two-digit SIC code).
Cole finds that firm leverage is negatively related to firm size, age,
profitability, liquidity, and credit-worthiness measures. In his model leverage is
positively related to firm tangible assets, limited liability, and number of bank and
non-bank financial service providers. He also finds that female owners use less
leverage. Cole concludes that in general his evidence is consistent with the
pecking order theory and inconsistent with the trade-off theory.
Additionally, Mueller (2008) examines the effect of entrepreneurs’ shares
of personal wealth invested in their firms on firm-level leverage. Her sample is a
group of small private firms from the SSBF 1998 data. She finds that leverage is
positively related to the share of personal wealth invested in the firm and
concludes that less diversified entrepreneurs are exposed to more idiosyncratic
risk. Thus they demand higher returns on their equity investment, suggesting a
higher cost of equity for their firms. Her point estimates suggest that firm leverage
increases by 0.75 percentage points as the entrepreneur’s proportional wealth
invested to the firm increases by 1 percentage point. 4
Mueller’s empirical analysis excludes all book insolvent firms. She argues
that these firms’ equity values are negative and should be excluded. This limits
the sample significantly. Book insolvent firms are more than 16% of all the
limited liability firms in SSBF 1998 and SSBF 2003 respectively. Yet the book
insolvent firms in 1998 and 2003 were still in operation several months later when

4

We replicate Mueller’s result in Appendix 1.
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the main interview took place5. Book insolvent firms may not necessarily have
negative market equity values. For example, it is possible that these firms are high
growth firms that do not have many assets in place. Because the denominator,
book assets, is a proxy for assets-in-place, high growth firms might have book
leverage ratios greater than one. Excluding the book insolvent firms might
artificially distort the regression results, because they are the highest levered firms
and their entrepreneurs are the least diversified. Mueller does not differentiate the
unlimited liability firms from limited liability ones and includes these unlimited
liability firms in her main analysis. As a robustness check, she also tests her
model on limited liability firms. The point estimates are not significantly different
from those in her main analysis. However, the significance level of the
coefficients decreases from better than the 1% level to 10% level. 6
Frank and Goyal (2007) suggest that empirical capital structure research
should differentiate financially constrained firms from unconstrained ones. Small
privately owned firms are often constrained in obtaining outside debt financing
(bank loans) due to reasons such as the lack of credit-worthiness. The leverage in
these small private firms might not be at the level that their owner-managers
prefer. One can argue that Mueller’s result could have been different if she had
differentiated financially constrained firms from unconstrained firms.
The trade-off theory and the pecking order theory tend to make different
inferences for firm size, growth options, tangible assets, and profitability. Agency

5

For example, in SSBF 2003, sample firms in the survey reported their financial standings in
2003. Interviews were carried out in 2004 and 2005.
6
Her sample size decreases from 2617 observations to 1406 observations when she excludes
unlimited liability firms.
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theory tends to make the same inferences as the trade-off theory. However, the
underlying reasoning is different for the trade-off theory and agency theory. The
trade-off theory explains the firm’s capital structure as the equilibrium between
tax shields and expected deadweight bankruptcy costs. Agency theory suggests
that the firm’s capital structure is a result between the agency conflict between
shareholders and debtholders. The pecking order theory attempts to explain the
firm’s capital structure as a result of adverse selection between owner-managers
and outside investors.
On the empirical side, Frank and Goyal (2007) find evidence consistent
with the trade-off theory by examining the publicly traded firms in annual
Compustat data for the period from 1950 to 2003. By using small privately owned
firms in SSBF 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003, Cole (2008) shows results in support
of the pecking order theory. One possible explanation for these different findings
is that small privately owned firms have more severe information asymmetry
problems than the publicly traded firms because privately owned firms are not
required to be audited nor disclose information to the public. Furthermore, some
privately owned firms, such as S-corporations, do not pay corporate taxes and
have no benefit of tax shields, which is the key element of the trade-off theory.
Therefore, it is not surprising that researchers find evidence consistent with the
pecking order theory when they examine privately owned firms and evidence
supporting the trade-off theory when they examine publicly traded firms.
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III.

Data
We use data from the SSBF 2003 conducted by the Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System (FED). In 1987, 1993, 1998,and 2003, the FED
collected information on small businesses that have fewer than 500 employees.7
Sample firms in all SSBF data sets were selected from Dun’s Market Identifiers
(DMI) database, maintained by Dun & Bradstreet Corporation (D&B). However,
firms’ identities in each SSBF remained confidential, and they were not
necessarily selected in the other SSBF data sets. Among these surveys, SSBF 1998
and SSBF 2003 reported information on entrepreneurs’ personal wealth outside of
their firms. We use SSBF 2003 data for our main analysis and SSBF 1998 data as
a robustness check.
In 2003 a total of 9,701,023 firms were initially selected as the survey
frame after the survey staff excluded governmental, financial, and agricultural
firms; firms that were branches, divisions, or subsidiaries of a parent business8;
firms with more than 500 employees; and firms that were not in operation as of
the date of the main interview (2004 or 2005). The survey staff then sampled
37,600 firms from the sample frame. There were 4,240 firms that completed
interviews.
The survey participants reported information on principal ownership
share; firm’s equity; principal owner’s equity in home residence; principal

7

In 2008, the FED announced that it would not continue the SSBF.
The survey staff sets this screen to ensure that only independently operated businesses are
included in the survey. Firms are ineligible for the survey if a holding company owns 50% or
more of the firms. However, firms are still eligible if they are subsidiaries of other firms as long as
other firms do not own 50% or more of the sampled firms. We remove firms that are owned by
other firms at the later stage.
8
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owner’s other net worth (excluding home equity); firm’s two-digit SIC code;
firm’s total assets; total liabilities; total sales; etc. Firms in SSBF 2003 have fiscal
year-end dates ranging from July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004. Survey interviews
were conducted between July and December 2004. Those firms whose fiscal year
ended between January 1 and June 30 were asked to report their balance sheet and
income statement data as of fiscal year 2004 whereas firms whose fiscal year
ended between July 1 and December 31 were asked to provided these data as of
fiscal year 2003. A total of 85 firms (2% of the sample) still reported partial year
numbers on income statement data (survey question P1: full-year vs. partial year)9.
In such a case, survey staff constructed a fiscal year adjustment factor, which is
the ratio of 365 to the number of days the income statement covered, to adjust
variables such as total sales, profit, etc. If firms reported partial year numbers, all
amounts reported for the items on the income statement were adjusted to full-year
equivalents by multiplying the income statement items to the adjustment factor.
We excluded firms whose principal owners were not individuals. If the
principal owner of a sample firm was another firm, the computed wealth
allocation variable only described the wealth allocation of the parent company
rather than the wealth allocation of the decision-maker in the parent company. A
total of 84 firms (0.024% of the sample) were excluded in this process. In our
main analysis, we excluded firms with unlimited liability because there is no clear
distinction between entrepreneurs’ firm wealth and out-of-firm wealth without the
protection of limited liability. There were 1499 observations that are unlimited

9

In a robustness check, we excluded these firms that reported partial year numbers. The results
were consistent with the results when we included them.
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liability firms (35% of the sample). In a robustness check, we studied a sample
that included these unlimited liability firms.10
Frank and Goyal (2007) suggest that empirical capital structure research
should differentiate financially constrained firms from unconstrained ones. We
focus on firms that are not financially constrained by excluding firms that were
declined credits and firms which feared being declined and did not apply in the
past three years. Data item MRL4 in SSBF 2003 reports that a total of 202 (4.7%
of the sample) firms were declined loans. Data item MRL31 reports that a total of
621 (14.6% of the sample) firms were discouraged to apply for loans.
Outliers can generate seriously misleading conclusions if we ignore them.
The most common method of dealing with the outliers is to remove the extreme
observations (truncation). For example, Frank and Goyal (2007) truncated key
variables at the 0.05% level in both tails of the distribution. We truncated the
extreme observations in the following measures at 1% and 99%: leverage, firm
size, profitability, liquidity11, and tangible assets.12 We obtained a sample of 2,091
firms after excluding outliers. In a robustness check, we also winsorized these key
variables at 1% and 99% and studied a sample of 2233 observations.

IV.

Methodology
1. Model
Our estimation model is:

10

In section V, we discuss the reason of excluding unlimited liability firms in more details.
Truncation of extreme values on this measure is at 5%.
12
We discuss the definition of these variables in the next section.
11
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Leveragei     * DIVi   * CVi   i

(1)
in which Leveragei is the ratio of total loans to total assets or as a robustness
check, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for firm i. We show later that the
results are comparable with either dependent variable. DIVi is the ratio of
entrepreneur i’s out-of-firm wealth to his total net worth, which measures
entrepreneur i’s wealth allocation level. CVi is a vector of control variables which
includes firm i’s financial statement variables (log of total assets, return on assets,
liquidity, tangible assets, etc.); number of financial service providers;
entrepreneurs’ demographic information (experience, gender and founder status);
and firms’ and entrepreneurs’ personal credit-worthiness. We discuss these
control variables in more detail in the following paragraphs.  i is of course, the
error term. We assume heteroskedasticity and use robust standard errors in our
regression.

2. Variables and Predictions
We define the variables of regression 1 in Table 113. We define the
additional control variables we use in the robustness check in Table 2. We show
the predicted signs of the variables in Table 3. SSBF defines total loans as the sum
of the outstanding principle of loans, mortgages, notes, bonds, capital leases, and
any non-recourse loans. Total liabilities are equal to total loans plus current
liabilities such as accounts payable, accrued expenses, taxes payable, and
13

All tables are presented in Appendix I.
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prepayments and deposits or advances from customers, etc. The ratio of total
loans to total assets (LR1) is a more popular measure of leverage than the ratio of
total liabilities to total assets (LR2) because loans rather than accounts payable
and other current liabilities items are considered a capital structure decision. The
cross-sectional correlation coefficient between these two leverage measures is
87% for SSBF 2003 and 81% for SSBF 1998. We present results using both
measures, but the ratio of total loans to total assets is our main focus.
Extant capital structure literature has used market value of leverage as the
main choice of dependent variable and book value of leverage as a robustness
check. In the case of privately owned firms, market value of leverage is
unavailable. Moreover, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that managers make the
financial structure decisions based on book values rather than market values.
Their survey also shows that CEOs state that they do not rebalance their firms’
debt policy in response to the market equity price. This is likely to be even more
profound for very small privately held firms.
We measure an entrepreneur’s wealth allocation by using the ratio of his
wealth outside of his firm (out-of-firm wealth) to his total net worth. SSBF 2003
reports the principal owner’s home equity after deducting all mortgages from the
market value of the house (data item U7_1) and the principal owner’s total net
worth excluding equity in his home and equity in his firm (data item U8). The
entrepreneur’s out-of-firm wealth is computed as the sum of these two items
(U7_1 and U8). The entrepreneur’s firm wealth is equal to the product of his
share of ownership and the firm’s equity (total assets minus total liabilities).
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Around 16% of our sample firms are book insolvent, suggesting that they
may have negative equity values and thus, negative entrepreneurs’ firm wealth.
Mueller (2008) excluded book insolvent firms from her analysis. However, these
firms were still in operation during the interview time, which was months after the
end of their last fiscal year. Furthermore, the leverage levels in these firms could
be the levels that entrepreneurs prefer according to their risk preferences. Because
we focus on firms with limited liability, we set the firm equity to zero if the firm
is book insolvent. We compute the entrepreneur’s total net worth as the sum of his
firm wealth and his out-of-firm wealth. Therefore, our main variable of interest,
the entrepreneur’s wealth allocation (DIV), is the ratio of the entrepreneur’s outof-firm wealth to his total net worth. This variable measures the percentage of an
entrepreneur’s wealth allocated outside of his firm. The entrepreneur is more
tolerate to the financial risk of his firm investment when the DIV is higher.
We hypothesize that entrepreneurs with more wealth invested in their
firms use less leverage to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. In contrast,
entrepreneurs with more wealth outside of the firms use more leverage because
they can absorb more risk of losing their firm investments. Therefore, we expect
leverage to be positively related to the entrepreneur’s wealth allocation measure,
DIV, as indicated in column 7 of Table 3.
When some entrepreneurs use out-of-firm personal assets as collateral or
personal guarantees to obtain loans for their firms, that part of their out-of-firm
assets is subject to the claims of firms’ creditors and is tied to their firms. We
adjust out-of-firm assets by subtracting the amount of collateralized or guaranteed
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loans from the out-of-firm assets. DIV2 is the ratio of the adjusted out-of-firm
assets to entrepreneurs’ total net worth. 14
We control for capital structure determinants that have been identified in
the extant literature. Frank and Goyal (2007) review the extant empirical literature
and suggest that only a small number of determinants are statistically and
economically significant. These variables include growth options, firm size,
tangible assets, and profitability. The most common proxy for firm size in the
literature is the natural logarithm of total assets.15
The trade-off theory suggests that the firm’s leverage is optimal when the
marginal benefit of tax shields is equal to the marginal expected deadweight costs
of bankruptcy. As shown in column 1 of Table 3, it implies a positive relation
between leverage and firm size because larger firms are more diversified and have
lower default risk. Firms with lower default risk tend to use more debt. The
pecking order theory suggests that entrepreneurs prefer to use retained earnings,
then debt, and then equity because of the adverse selection problem. The relation
between leverage and firm size can be either negative or positive as shown in
column 2. One can argue that the pecking order theory implies a positive relation
between leverage and firm size because larger firms have fewer information
asymmetry problems and lower cost of debt. However, firm size can also be used

14

We discuss the difference between unlimited liability firms and limited liability firms that use
personal guarantees in section V.
15
Researchers prefer the log of total assets to the dollar amount of total assets because they can
explain the coefficient as the change of percentage points in leverage corresponding to the
percentage change in total assets. Furthermore, the log transformation captures the non-linear
relation between leverage and firm size because $1 million difference in size is more important to
the leverage of a small firm than to the leverage of a large one. We measure firm size by using the
natural logarithm of total assets (SSBF 2003 data item R12).
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as a proxy for retained earnings because larger firms tend to accumulate more
retained earnings. In this case, the pecking order theory predicts a negative
relation between leverage and firms size. Agency theory argues that agency
conflicts exist between shareholders and debtholders. Larger firms have better
reputations and fewer information asymmetry problems. As a result, larger firms
have lower cost of debt. Therefore, it implies that the financial leverage and firm
size are positively related as shown in column 3.
Frank and Goyal (2007) find that leverage is positively related to firm size.
Their finding is in support of the trade-off theory (column 4). However, as shown
in column 5, Cole (2008) finds that leverage is negatively related to firm size. His
result is consistent with the pecking-order theory. Mueller (2008) finds no
significant relation between leverage and firm size (column 6). We use the natural
log of total assets to measure firm size. If the estimated coefficient is negative, we
suggest that the result is more consistent with the pecking order theory and firm
size is a proxy of accumulated retained earnings rather than adverse selection. If
the estimated coefficient is positive, we cannot reject any of the three theories.
The market-to-book ratio, which is the popular proxy for growth options,
is not available because all of the sample firms are privately owned. Barclay,
Smith, and Morellec (2006) suggest using Research and Development (R&D) to
sales, R&D plus advertising to sales, and the earnings-price ratio as alternative
proxies for growth options. However, none of these variables is available in SSBF
data. Instead, Cole (2008) uses the increase in the number of employees compared
with the same firms’ employment of the previous year to proxy for growth
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opportunities in SSBF firms. Therefore, our measure of growth options is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firms’ numbers of employees increase in
2003 and 0 otherwise. We also use a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firms’
sales increase in 2003 and 0 otherwise as an alternative measure for growth
options. 16
The trade-off theory suggests that leverage should be negatively related to
growth options because higher growth firms lose more of their value when these
firms are financially distressed, as indicated in column 1 of Table 3. In contrast,
column 2 shows that the pecking order theory implies a positive relation between
leverage and growth options. The intuition is that the high growth firms have
more investments and accumulate more debt over time, holding profitability
constant. In column 3, agency theory suggests a negative relation between
financial leverage and growth options. It is easier for owner-managers in high
growth firms to replace low- risk projects with high-risk projects. It is also more
difficult for debtholders in high growth firms to monitor this substitution behavior.
Therefore, debt financing costs more in high growth firms.
The empirical evidence can be found in columns 4, 5 and 6. Frank and
Goyal (2007) find that leverage is negatively related to growth options, consistent
with the trade-off theory. They measure growth options by using the market-tobook ratio. Cole (2008) finds no significant relation between leverage and his
proxy for growth options. However, he uses the increase in the number of
employees to proxy for growth options because the market-to-book ratio is not
available in his data set. Our measure of growth options is a dummy variable that
16

The increases in employment and sales variables are not available in SSBF 1998.
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equals 1, if the firm increased its number of employees in the previous year, and 0
otherwise. We also use an alternative measure, which is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the firm experienced an increase in sales in the previous year and 0
otherwise. If the coefficient is positive, we infer that the evidence supports the
pecking order theory. If the coefficient is negative, it is more consistent with the
trade-off theory or agency theory.
Frank and Goyal (2007) measure profitability by using the ratio of
operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) to total assets. SSBF
does not report any information on depreciation. Thus we use ROA, the ratio of
profit after tax (SSBF 2003 data item PROFIT) to total assets, as an alternative
measure of profitability.
According to the trade-off theory, profitable firms should use more
financial leverage because these firms have lower expected bankruptcy costs.
Thus, column 1 of Table 3 shows that leverage should be positively related to
profitability. The pecking order theory implies a negative relation between
leverage and profitability because profitable firms have more retained earnings
and use less debt financing as indicated in column 2. Agency theory does not
make a clear inference on the relation between leverage and profitability.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the empirical findings. Frank and Goyal (2007)
measure profitability by using the ratio of operating income before depreciation to
total assets. They find a negative relation between leverage and profitability. Cole
(2008) also shows that leverage is negatively related to profitability. His measure
of profitability is return on total assets (ROA). Following Cole, we measure

25

profitability by using ROA. If the coefficient is positive, the evidence is more
consistent with the trade-off theory. However, a negative coefficient is more
consistent with the pecking order theory.
The popular measure for tangible assets in literature is the ratio of net
property, plant and equipment (Compustat item 8) to total assets. The reason for
using net property, plant, and equipment is that these assets are tangible and can
be used as collateral. SSBF 2003 reports book value of land (data item R6) and net
book value of depreciable assets (data item R7). However, data item R7 is defined
as the net book value of any buildings and equipment and any other depreciable,
depletable, or intangible assets. This variable does not differentiate intangible
assets from tangible assets. If we include it as tangible assets, we could underestimate the coefficient and the result would be misleading. Therefore, our
measure for tangible assets is the sum of inventory and book value of land divided
by total assets.
The trade-off theory suggests that firms with tangible assets tend to lose
less value when they are financially distressed. Thus it implies a positive relation
between leverage and tangible assets as shown in column 1 of Table 3. Under the
pecking order theory, firms with more tangible assets have fewer information
asymmetry problems and lower cost of debt. In column 2, the implied sign is
positive. In column 3, agency theory suggests that financial leverage is positively
related to tangible assets because tangible assets make it difficult for ownermanagers to replace high-risk projects with low-risk ones.
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Frank and Goyal (2007) use the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment
to total assets to measure tangible assets. They show that leverage is positively
related to tangible assets, supporting the trade-off theory. Cole (2008) uses the
ratio of inventory and property, plant, and equipment17 to total assets to measure
tangible assets. He also finds a positive relation between leverage and tangible
assets. We expect the sign of the coefficient to be positive as indicated in column
7.
Cole (2008) finds that leverage is related to firm age, liquidity, number of
firms’ financial service providers (banks and non-bank finance firms), and gender.
Thus we control for these factors. We define liquidity as the ratio of cash to total
assets. The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) predicts
that firms with financial slack use internal financing rather than outside financing
(debt and equity) to finance their projects. In column 2 of Table 3, we present the
prediction of the pecking order theory. As shown in column 5, Cole (2008) finds
leverage is negatively related to liquidity. He uses the ratio of cash to total assets
to measure liquidity. We expect leverage to be negatively related to liquidity,
which is consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory. Our measure
of liquidity is also the ratio of cash to total assets.
Cole (2008) finds that leverage increases with the number of firms’
financial service providers. He argues that firms tied to more financial service
providers have more access to debt financing. An alternative explanation is that
firms have a lower cost of debt when they deal with more financial service
providers because of the competition among these financial service providers. We
17

Property, plant, and equipment is not available in SSBF 2003.
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expect leverage to be positively related to the number of financial service
providers because firms associated with more financial service providers tend to
use more debt financing due to the competition among the financial service
providers and the lower cost of debt. Our inference is presented in column 7 of
Table 3.
Older firms have more financial slack because they have more time to
generate retained earnings. Under the pecking order theory, one can argue that
firms with more financial slack prefer to use internal financing. Thus, it suggests a
negative relation between leverage and firm age as shown in column 2 of Table 3.
An alternative interpretation is also available. Older firms are better known and
have less adverse selection. Thus leverage can be positively related to firm age.
Cole (2008) uses the natural log of firm age in years to measure firm age and
finds a negative relation between leverage and firm age, which supports the
pecking order theory. We also use the natural log of firm age in years to measure
firm age. The intuition of using log transformation is that we expect one-year
difference in firm age to be more important to younger firms than it to older firms.
Entrepreneurs’ working experience in their fields can play an important
role in obtaining credit. More experienced entrepreneurs are likely to know more
bankers and can obtain loans more easily. We use the natural log of
entrepreneurs’ experience and expect the sign of the coefficient to be positive.
The intuition of using log transformation is that we expect one-year difference in
entrepreneurs’ experience to be more important to less experienced entrepreneurs
than it to more experienced entrepreneurs.
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Some studies show that females are less likely to take risk than males. For
example, Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) find that females allocate significantly less
of their pension funds to stocks than males. Collerett and Aubry (1990) find that
women business owners tend to be conservative and avoid using debt financing.
Therefore, gender could be a proxy for entrepreneurs’ risk preferences. We
include a dummy variable equal to 1 if entrepreneurs are female to control for the
possible gender effect on leverage and 0 otherwise. We expect the coefficient of
Gender to be negative.
Entrepreneurs who are the original founders of the firms might be
emotionally tied to their firms and avoid financial risk by limiting leverage usage.
We include a dummy variable that equals 1 if entrepreneurs are original founders
and 0 otherwise. We expect the coefficient to be negative. However, it is also
possible that we fail to find a significant coefficient because founders have the
option to be highly levered and only commit funds to their firms when needed.
SSBF 2003 reports information on an entrepreneur’s personal and business
credit-worthiness. We control for credit-worthiness of entrepreneurs and firms by
constructing two dummy variables. The first dummy variable is equal to 1 if firms
declared bankruptcy in the previous seven years and 0 otherwise. The second
dummy variable is equal to 1 if entrepreneurs declared personal bankruptcy in the
previous seven years and 0 otherwise. We hypothesize that entrepreneurs with
more credit-worthiness find it easier to obtain credits. Thus, the expected signs of
these two coefficients are negative.
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Table 3 presents the theoretical predictions and empirical findings of
different determinants of capital structure. In columns 1, 2, and 3, we show the
inferences of the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and agency theory
respectively. In column 4, we show the empirical findings of Frank and Goyal
(2007). The empirical results of Cole (2008) are presented in column 5. Mueller
(2008)’s results are presented in column 6. In column 7, we show the inferences
of regression 1.

V.

Results
1. Summary Statistics
We present the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and

maximum of key variables in Table 4. The average total loans to total assets ratio
is 44% and the average total liabilities to total assets ratio is 66%. One might
expect leverage in small private firms to be much higher than leverage in public
firms because private firms do not have access to public equity markets as public
ones do. However, we find evidence that leverage levels in publicly traded firms
of roughly similar size are even higher than those of private firms in our sample.
We collect all firms that have no more than 500 employees in 2003 fiscal year
from Compustat. Although not shown in Table 4, the median total liabilities to
total assets ratio in these small publicly traded firms is 47%. The mean of this
ratio in small public firms is 87%, much higher than the mean ratio of 66% in
private firms.18 Thus the evidence does not support the notion that private firms

18

We obtain the mean and median leverage ratios of these small public firms after truncating the
sample firms at 1% and 99% to adjust for the influence of extreme outliers.
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should have higher leverage because they cannot raise capital from the public
equity markets.
The average DIV is 0.79, suggesting that entrepreneurs on average allocate
79% of their wealth outside of their firms. After adjusting for out-of-firm wealth
collateral and personal guarantees, we observe a lower value for the average outof-firm wealth allocation measure. The average DIV2 is 0.71, suggesting that
entrepreneurs on average invest 71% of their wealth outside of their firms. We
also observe a lower value of the median DIV2 (84%) than the value of the
median DIV (88%).
Table 4 shows that the average firm size (log of total assets) is 13.13,
suggesting that on average firms have total assets of about $0.5 million. The
smallest firm size value is 6.40 (just $602), while the largest value is 17.32 ($33
million). The average firm age (log of firm age) is 2.6, suggesting that firms have
been in their businesses for about 14 years. The youngest firm has just operated
for 1 year, while the oldest firm has existed for 103 years.
The average return on assets (ROA) value is 0.73. However, the median
ROA is only 0.14. The distribution of ROA is still right-skewed even after we
remove extreme observations beyond the 1st and 99th percentiles, suggesting that
the estimation result can be biased because of the existence of a minority group of
observations with high ROA.
The mean tangible assets ratio is 20% while the median is 8%. The mean
liquidity ratio is 0.21, suggesting that firms hold 21% of their total assets in the
form of cash on average. Table 4 shows that the mean Number of Financial
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Service Providers (FSP) is 3.14, suggesting that firms have approximately 3
financial service providers on average. Some firms have as many as 16 financial
service providers, while other firms have none. In our sample, 64% of the
entrepreneurs are the original founders of their businesses. Only 16% of the
entrepreneurs are female, while 84% are male.
On average, entrepreneurs have around 20 years of experience in their
own businesses (log of experience is 3.00). The most experienced entrepreneur
has been working in his field for 71 years (log of experience is 4.26), while the
least experienced one has only 1 year (log of experience is 0). Table 4 also shows
that most entrepreneurs are credit-worthy in terms of both firm and personal
bankruptcy histories. Less than 1% of the entrepreneurs have declared firm or
personal bankruptcy in the previous 7 years.

2. Multivariate Statistics
Table 5 Column 1 shows that the coefficient for the allocations measure,
DIV, is around 0.830 at better than the 1% significance level, suggesting that the
ratio of total loans to total assets increases by 0.830 percentage points when DIV
increases by 1 percentage point. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that
entrepreneurs who allocate more wealth outside their firms tend to use more
leverage.
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of firm size (log of total assets) is
negative and significant at better than the 1% level. This result suggests that the
leverage ratio decreases by 0.065 percentage points as the firm’s total assets
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increase by 1 percent. This finding is consistent with the inference of the peckingorder theory that leverage is negatively related to firm size. The coefficient on
firm size is much smaller than the coefficient of DIV, suggesting that wealth
allocation plays a more important role in determining financial leverage than firm
size does in small privately owned firms which have limited liability.
The positive coefficient of growth options (measured by the increase of
the number of employees) is consistent with the inference of the pecking-order
theory. However, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero at the 10%
significance level. The coefficient of ROA is negative and significant at better
than the 5% level, which is consistent with the inference of the pecking order
theory. This result suggests that leverage decreases by 3.6 percentage points as
ROA increases by 100%.
Column 1 shows that leverage decreases by 0.281 percentage points as
liquidity (measured by the ratio of cash to total assets) increases by 1 percentage
point. The coefficient is significant at better than the 1% level. This result is
consistent with the prediction of the pecking-order theory that firms with more
financial slack tend to use less debt financing. The coefficient of tangible assets is
positive, which is consistent with the predictions of extant capital structure
theories. However, it is not statistically significant at the 10% level.
The coefficient on the number of financial service providers is positive
and significant at better than the 1% level, suggesting that leverage increases by
4.4 percentage points as the firm adds one more financial service provider. This
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result is consistent with our prediction that firms with more financial service
providers can obtain less costly credits and use more debt financing.
The estimate of firm age is also consistent with the prediction of the
pecking order theory that older firms have more financial slack and use less debt.
The coefficient is negative and significant at better than the 5% level, suggesting
that leverage decreases by 4.8 percentage points as the firm age increases by 1%.
The coefficient of entrepreneurs’ experience is positive. However, it is not
statistically significant at the 10% level when we use DIV to measure wealth
allocation. When we adjust the effect of personal guarantees and out-of-firm
assets collateral by using DIV2, column 2 shows that the coefficient of experience
is positive and statistically significant at better than the 10% level, suggesting the
financial leverage ratio increases by 6.6 percentage points when the
entrepreneur’s experience increases by 1%.
Table 5 shows that female entrepreneurs are not necessarily more
conservative in using debt than male ones. The coefficient is negative, which is
consistent with our prediction. However, it is not statistically different from zero
at the 10% significance level.
We find that entrepreneurs who are the original founders of their
businesses use less debt than other entrepreneurs, which is consistent with our
prediction that entrepreneurs who are original founders are more emotionally tied
with their firms and more conservative in using debt. The coefficient is negative
and statistically significant at better than the 5% level, suggesting that leverage
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ratio in firms where entrepreneurs are original founders is 8.3 percentage points
lower than it is in other firms.
The coefficient of the entrepreneurs’ personal bankruptcy dummy variable
is negative and significant at better than 10% level, which is consistent with our
prediction. This result suggests that firms’ leverage decreases by 36% if
entrepreneurs have declared personal bankruptcy before. This result shows that
entrepreneurs who have declared personal bankruptcy in the previous 7 years
significantly use less debt financing on the firm level. The coefficient of the firm
bankruptcy dummy variable is not statistically different than zero at better than
10% level.
Column 2 presents the estimation result of regression 1 using DIV2, the
alternative measure of wealth allocation. We compute DIV2 by deducting the total
amount of loans that entrepreneurs obtain by using out-of-firm assets as loan
collateral, personal guarantees, and co-signers from their out-of-firm wealth and
then dividing the residual by entrepreneurs’ total net worth. Column 2 shows that
the coefficient of DIV2 is positive and significant at better than the 1% level,
which is consistent with our prediction that entrepreneurs who have more
personal wealth allocated outside of their firms tend to use more debt financing.
Using DIV2, we find that leverage increases by 0.425 percentage points as DIV2
increases by 1 percentage point. This result shows that the effect of wealth
allocation on leverage is reduced after we adjust for personal guarantees and outof-firm assets as collateral because entrepreneurs actually allocate more wealth to
their firms than they seemingly do when we use DIV.
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Column 2 also shows that leverage is negatively related to firm size,
profitability, liquidity, and firm age. Furthermore, leverage is positively related to
the number of financial service providers and entrepreneurs’ experience. These
results are generally consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory.
In column 3 we use the ratio of total liabilities to total assets as the
alternative measure of leverage. The coefficient of DIV is positive and significant
at better than the 1% level, which is consistent with our prediction and the result
in column 1. The estimation results on the control variables are also generally
consistent with the pecking order theory.
In column 4 we present the result of regression 1 using the increase in
sales dummy variable (Growth Options Sales) as an alternative proxy for growth
options. The estimation results on DIV and most control variables are consistent
with our predictions and those presented in column 1. However, the coefficient of
Growth Options Sales itself is not statistically different from zero at better than
10% level. Column 5 shows the result of regression 1 on the SSBF 1998 data. The
coefficient of DIV is positive and significant at better than the 1% level. This
result is consistent with our prediction.

3. Firm Report Partial Year Data
There are 85 firms in SSBF 2003 that report partial year numbers on the
financial statement. By including them, our estimation result could be biased
because these firms’ operations can be seasonal. In column 6, we test regression 1
using the data set that excludes these firms. Some firms that report partial year
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numbers are unlimited liability firms or overlap with the truncated outliers. Thus
we obtain a sample of 2055 observations after we exclude the firms that report
partial year numbers. Column 6 shows that the coefficient of DIV is positive and
statistically significant at better than 1% level, which is consistent with our
prediction and the result presented in column 1. Thus, these 85 firms that report
partial year data do not bias our results. The coefficients of other independent
variables are generally consistent with the result in column 1. The only exception
is that the coefficient of tangible assets is positive and significant at the 10%,
suggesting that leverage increases by 0.13 percentage points as the ratio of cash to
total assets increases by 1 percentage point.

4. Winsorization
Another common method of dealing with the influence of outliers is to use
winsorization, in which the most extreme tails of the distribution are replaced by
the specific percentiles of the data. We winsorize LR1, LR2, Profitability, Firm
Size, ROA, and Liquidity at 1 and 99 percentiles and present the estimation result
of regression 1 in column 7 and column 8. Column 7 shows that the coefficient of
DIV is positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level, which is
consistent with our prediction and the result presented in column 1. Column 8
shows that the coefficient of DIV2 is also positive and statistically significant at
better than the 1% level. The magnitudes of these two coefficients are comparable
to those when we use truncated data. The coefficients of other independent
variables are generally consistent with those presented in column 1 except the
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coefficients on profitability and experience. The coefficient on profitability is
negative, which is consistent with the earlier estimation. However, it is not
statistically different from zero. The coefficient on experience is positive and
significant at the 10% level or better, which is consistent with our prediction that
more experienced entrepreneurs find it easier to obtain credits. This result
suggests that leverage increases by 8.5 percentage points (11 percentage points in
column 8) when experience increases by 1 percent.

5.

50% Or More Ownership

Although entrepreneurs in our sample are the largest shareholders of their
firms, some of them do not own more than 50% of the total shares. In this case, it
is possible that their wealth allocation do not affect the firm-level capital structure
decisions because of the lack of dominant shareholdings. We test regression 1 on
a group of entrepreneurs who own more than 50% of the shares. There are 1284
observations in this data set. Column 1 presents the estimation result of regression
1 using this subset of firms with dominant shareholders. The coefficient of DIV is
positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level, which is consistent
with our prediction and the earlier estimation results. The coefficients of other
independent variables are generally consistent with those presented in column 1
except those on tangible assets and owner bankruptcy dummy. The coefficient on
tangible assets is positive and statistically significant at better than the 5% level,
suggesting that leverage increases by 0.2 percentage points as tangible assets
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increases by 1 percentage point. The coefficient on owner bankruptcy dummy is
negative but statistically insignificant at the 10% level.

6. Additional Control Variables
Table 6 presents the results when we include additional control variables.
These control variables include: (a) dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm
has been delinquent on its business obligations for 60 or more days in the
previous 3 years and 0 otherwise; (b) dummy variable that is equal to 1 if any
court judgment has been rendered against the firm in the previous 3 years and 0
otherwise; (c) dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the owners have been
delinquent on their personal obligations for 60 or more days in the previous 3
years and 0 otherwise; (d) dummy variable that is equal to 1 if any court judgment
has been rendered against the owner in the previous 3 years and 0 otherwise; (e)
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if entrepreneurs are Caucasians and 0
otherwise; (f) entrepreneurs’ ages in years; (g) dummy variable that is equal to 1
if firms pay corporate tax (C-corporation) and 0 otherwise; (h) the credit score
from Dun and Bradstreet (D&B). D&B categorizes the firms’ creditworthiness
into 6 grades (1 for the riskiest and 6 for the least risky); and (i) a series of
dummy variables that equal 1 if firms have the industry-specific two-digit SIC
codes and 0 otherwise. Table 2 defines these additional control variables.
The coefficients of DIV and DIV2 in Table 6 are both positive and
significant at better than the 1% level, which are consistent with our prediction.
The coefficients of other independent variables are generally comparable to those
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presented in column 1 except the one on owner bankruptcy dummy. The
coefficient on owner bankruptcy dummy is negative but statistically insignificant
at the 10% level. The coefficients of the additional control variables are mostly
insignificant at the 10% level. The additional control variables that contribute to
the variation of leverage ratio are the dummy variables of service (SIC 70-89),
retail (SIC52-59) and wholesale (SIC 50-51) industries, suggesting that firms in
these industries tend to have a lower leverage ratio than manufacturing firms.
These results are consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory that
firms with fewer fixed assets tend to more information asymmetry and higher cost
of debt.

7. Multicollinearity

If any of the right-hand-side variables is highly correlated with other
independent variables, then regression 1 will yield unbiased but inefficient
estimates because of the large variances for the estimators. We examine the
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerances (1/VIF) values of regression 119.
VIF represents the inflation in the variance of the parameter due to collinearity.
Table 7 shows that the VIF values ranges from 2.46 to 1.01, significantly lower
than the critical value of 5. Therefore, it is fair to claim that standard errors are not
overestimated in regression 1 and mutlicollinearity is not affecting the estimation
of regression 1.
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See Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1985) Applied Linear Statistical Models, 2nd
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8.

Endogeneity

In Table 8 we show the results of a Hausman test by using entrepreneurs’
education as an instrumental variable (dummy variable, College, is equal to 1 if
entrepreneurs have college degrees or above and 0 otherwise). Mueller (2008)
uses entrepreneurs’ age and gender as instrumental variables for their wealth
allocations. We also use age and gender as alternative instrumental variables.
However, using Mueller’s data, we show that age appears to be directly correlated
with firms’ leverage, suggesting that it might not be a good instrumental variable
for DIV.
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) show that the less-educated investors hold
less-diversified portfolios. Thus, we argue that education is correlated with
leverage only through wealth allocations and use College (1 if education level is
college degree or above and 0 otherwise) as the instrumental variable for the
endogenous variable, DIV. The underlying reason is that it is likely that college
educated entrepreneurs have higher incomes, accumulate more out-of-firm wealth
before they become self-employed, and keep their portfolios more diversified than
others.
In Table 8, columns 1 and 4 show that the coefficients for College are not
significant, suggesting that College is not related to leverage other than through
DIV. Columns 2 and 5 present the regression result of DIV and DIV2 on College
and other control variables. The coefficients of College in both columns are
positive and significant at better than 5% levels, which are consistent with the
result of Goetzmann and Kumar (2008). We then obtain the fitted value from the
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column 2 and column 5 regressions and regress the ratio of total loans to total
assets on the fitted values, DIV (DIV2), and other control variables. The
coefficients of the fitted values are not significantly different from zero,
suggesting that endogeneity does not bias the regression result significantly. OLS
(or WLS) is a more efficient approach than the Two-Stage-Least-Square
approach.

9.

Unlimited Liability Firms and Limited Liability Firms Using
Personal Guarantees

We argue that the wealth allocation of entrepreneurs in unlimited liability
firms do not matter in determining their firm-level capital structure decisions
because, without the limited liability protection, all creditors of the firms can
claim entrepreneurs’ out-of-firm assets. This is different than limited liability
firms that use personal guarantees to obtain loans. Personal guarantee is creditorspecific because only the creditor who has the personal guarantee from the
entrepreneur can secure the loan repayment by claiming the entrepreneur’s out-offirm assets in case of firm bankruptcy. For example, an entrepreneur in a limited
liability firm obtains $1,000 loans from two creditors. $500 is obtained from
creditor A by using a personal guarantee. $500 is borrowed from creditor B
without any personal guarantee. In this case, the entrepreneur shifts only $500 of
his out-of-firm wealth to firm-related wealth. In our dataset, on average, only 39%
of the total amounts of loans that a firm has are borrowed by using personal
guarantees (median is 0%). To avoid a significant reduction in our sample size, it

42

is more desirable to retain limited liability firms that use personal guarantees if we
can adjust the wealth shift effect caused by personal guarantees. We adjust the
effect of personal guarantees by computing DIV2, which accounts for the wealth
shift from out-of-firm wealth to firm wealth. In contrast, it is more desirable to
discard unlimited liability firms if entrepreneurs’ wealth allocation does not affect
financial leverage in these firms. In the remaining part of this section, we show
that that regression 1 does not apply to unlimited liability firms.
We use the generalized dummy variable technique developed by Gujarati
(1970 a, b) to examine whether DIV has a different effect on leverage in firms
with limited liability than in firms with unlimited liability. We introduce two
additional variables on the right-hand side of regression 1: a dummy variable that
is equal to1 if firms are limited liability firms and 0 otherwise; and an interaction
term that is the product of DIV and the dummy variable. The modified model is
shown below:

Leveragei    1 * DIVi   2 * LLi  3 * Interactioni   * CVi   i
(2)

where LLi is the dummy variable and Interactioni is the interaction term
of DIVi and LLi . Other variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 2. The null
hypothesis of this model is that  2 and  3 are not statistically different from zero,
which means the coefficients of DIVi and the intercepts are the same across
limited and unlimited liability firms. When LLi is equal to 0, the intercept term is

 and the coefficient of DIVi is 1 . When LLi is equal to 1, the intercept term is
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 +  2 and the coefficient of DIVi is 1 +  3 . If 1 is not statistically significant,
it means that Leveragei is not related to DIVi when LLi is equal to 0 (unlimited
liability firms). This null hypothesis is consistent with the economic intuition that
wealth allocation only affects entrepreneurs’ willingness to use financial leverage
in limited liability firms; entrepreneurs’ wealth are 100% tied to their firms in
unlimited liability firms and thus do not affect the financial leverage on the firm
level.
We test regression 2 on the dataset that includes both limited and
unlimited liability firms. In Table 9, column 1 presents the estimation result of
regression 2 on the dataset that includes both limited and unlimited liability firms.
The coefficient of DIV is not statistically different from zero, which suggests that
wealth allocation does not affect financial leverage in unlimited liability firms
( LLi =0) as expected by economic intuition. However, the coefficient of the
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level,
which indicates that financial leverage is positively related to wealth allocation
for limited liability firms ( LLi =1). This result is consistent with our earlier result
presented in Table 5. We also run regression 1 on a dataset that contains unlimited
liability firms as a robustness check. Column 2 shows that the coefficient of DIV
is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that wealth allocation does not
matter in determining financial leverage of unlimited liability firms.
We show that different model specifications should apply to limited
liability firms and unlimited liability firms. Because we are interested in the effect
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of wealth allocation on leverage in this paper, we focus on firms with limited
liability.

VI.

Policy Implication
Our research focuses on small privately owned firms that have limited

liability, which is a significant portion of all small privately owned firms. In our
nationally representative sample, limited liability firms account for more than
50% of all small privately owned firms. We do not intend to generalize our results
to the population of small businesses. However, our results have important policy
implications for incorporated small privately owned firms, which account for a
significant portion of the overall economy. On the micro-level, we show that
entrepreneurs in these firms adjust their firm-level capital structure according to
their wealth allocation. It is important for lenders to understand this relation so
that they can design products to meet entrepreneurs’ financing needs and control
lending risk.
On the macro-level, our findings are also meaningful in the following
aspects. First, the Small Business Administration (SBA) currently helps small
businesses in obtaining financing by offering loan guarantees. However, SBA
requires that these SBA-backed loans must also be personally guaranteed by any
person that owns 20% or more interest in the firm. If SBA-backed loans do not
offer better interest rates than loans obtained directly from banks using personal
guarantees, then personal guarantees merely shift wealth allocation from out-offirm wealth to firm wealth, which discourages entrepreneurs’ incentives to apply
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for loans. Thus we argue that the personal guarantee requirements of the SBAbacked loans are not necessarily helpful to entrepreneurs in privately held limited
liability firms unless borrowers can obtain better interest rates by using SBA.
Second, we show evidence that is consistent with the inference of the peckingorder theory in these firms where information asymmetry is more prevalent than
in public corporations. It is important for policy-makers to understand that
information asymmetry is an important factor that makes it more expensive and
difficult for these firms to finance their projects. Our findings are consistent with
the inference of the pecking order theory that smaller and younger firms are
adversely affected by the higher information asymmetry, which result in lower
financial leverage. However, outside debt financing is extremely important for
these very small and young privately-owned firms. One important policy
implication is that lenders and policy makers could develop mechanisms to reduce
the information asymmetry problem among small privately owned firms. For
example, a universal small business database which keeps track of businesses’
operational and financial information and business owners’ demographic
information might help in reducing the information asymmetry problem.
In our analysis, we also show that firms’ leverage increases with the
number of their financial service providers. This finding is important especially at
the current time when policy makers seek to revive the economy from a deep
recession. According to Girard (2009), since the financial crisis began in 2008,
the U.S. government has spent enormous amounts of money on bailing out
businesses that are “too big to fail”. However, as a critical part of the overall
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economy, small businesses are also facing credit constraints in the crisis. They
require the same attention as big businesses do. Our result suggests that small
privately owned firms benefit from more competition among lenders, which could
be meaningful for policy-makers when they design policies to revive the economy
from the recession.

VII.

Conclusion

In this paper we examine the relationship between entrepreneurs’
allocations of wealth and their firms’ leverage levels. We find that entrepreneurs’
wealth allocation, measured by the ratio of their out-of-firm wealth to their total
wealth, is positively related to their firm-level financial leverage. Compared to the
previous literature, we use a sample that is more representative of the population
by including book insolvent firms. Moreover, we show that the positive relation
between leverage and wealth allocation still exists after we adjust for the out-offirm wealth collateral, personal guarantees, and cosigners. Our paper contributes
to the literature by focusing on the effect of DIV on capital structure. We conclude
that an entrepreneur’s wealth allocation, which had been previously overlooked in
the traditional capital-structure literature, plays an important role in determining
firm-level capital structure.
It will be interesting if our analysis can be extended to publicly traded
firms when data on CEOs’ personal wealth becomes available. CEOs in publicly
traded firms also have a significant portion of their personal wealth tied to their
firms in the forms of stocks, stock options and restricted stocks. One can argue
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that CEOs’ wealth allocation could affect their firm-level decision-makings in
these publicly traded firms. May (1995) estimates the personal wealth of CEOs in
public traded corporations by using their accumulated salaries and finds CEOs’
wealth allocation affects their firm-level decisions, such as acquisition decisions.
Future research on the relation between CEOs wealth allocations and firm-level
capital structure by using observed personal wealth data are needed.
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TABLE 1. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES

Variable
LR1
LR2
DIV
DIV2
Size
Growth Options (Employment)
Growth Options (Sales)
Profitability
Tangible Assets
Liquidity
Firm Age
Number of FSP
Gender
Founder
Owner Bankruptcy
Firm Bankruptcy
Experience

Definition
Total loans divided by total assets
Total liabilities divided by total assets
The entrepreneur’s out-of-firm wealth divided by his total net worth
The entrepreneur’s out-of-firm wealth adjusted for collateral divided by his total net worth
Log of total assets
Dummy variable for firms with positive employment growth during 2003 fiscal year
Dummy variable for firms with positive sales growth during 2003 fiscal year
Net income divided by total assets
Sum of inventory and book value of land divided by total assets
Cash divided by total assets
Log of firm age
The number of the firm’s financial service providers
1 if the entrepreneur is female, 0 otherwise
1 if the entrepreneur is the original founder, 0 otherwise
1 if the entrepreneur declared personal bankruptcy in the previous 7 years, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm declared bankruptcy in the previous 7 years, 0 otherwise
Log of the entrepreneur’s experience in his current business (in years)

*Data are from the 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance
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TABLE 2. DEFINITIONS OF ADDITIONAL VARIABLES

Additional Variable
Firm Delinquency
Firm Judgment
Owner Delinquency
Firm Judgment
Credit Ratings
Outside Manager
Age
Race
Corporate Tax
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Utility
Wholesale
Retail
Service

Definition
1 if the firm has been delinquent on its business obligations for 60 or more days in the previous 3 years, 0 otherwise
1 if any judgment has been rendered against the firm in previous 3 years, 0 otherwise
1 if the entrepreneur has been delinquent on his business obligations for 60 or more days in the previous 3 years, 0 otherwise
1 if any judgment has been rendered against the entrepreneur in previous 3 years, 0 otherwise
Dun and Bradstreet Rank Credit Score – 1 most risky, 6 least risky
1 if the entrepreneur hires an outside manager, 0 otherwise
The entrepreneur’s age in years
1 if the entrepreneur is white, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm pays corporate tax, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm is in SIC 10-14: Mining, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm is in SIC 15-19: Construction, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm is in SIC 20-39: Manufacturing, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm is in SIC 40-49: Transportation/Public Utilities, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm is in SIC 50-51: Wholesale Trade, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm is in SIC 52-59: Retail Trade, 0 otherwise
1 if the firm is in SIC 70-89: Services, 0 otherwise
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TABLE 3. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF THE COEFFICIENTS

Variables
DIV
Firm Size
Growth Options
Profitability
Tangible Assets
Liquidity
Firm Age
FSP
Gender
Founder
Experience
Owner Bankruptcy
Firm Bankruptcy

1

Theory Predictions
2

3

Trade-Off
?
+
+
+
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

Pecking-Order
?
+/+/+/+/?
?
?
?
?
?

Agency
?
+
?
+
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

4
Frank &
Goyal
(2007)
?
+
+
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

Empirical Findings
5
6

Cole (2008)
?
0
+
+
?
?
-

Mueller
(2008)
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

7

Li (2009)
+
+/+/+/+/+
+
-

0 stands for the coefficient is not significant at the 10% level. ? stands for the theory having no prediction on the coefficient or
the variable is missing or not reported in the empirical study. Variables are defined in Table 1.
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TABLE 4. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of our key variables based on the SSBF 2003 data. Our sample has 2091 observations. Variables are defined in
Table 1.
Variable
Mean
LR1
LR2
DIV
DIV2
SIZE
Growth Options
Profitability
Tangible Assets
Liquidity
Firm Age
Number of FSP
Gender
Founder
Experience
Firm Bankruptcy
Owner Bankruptcy

Median
Std. Dev. Min
Max
0.44
0.20
0.81
0.00
0.66
0.47
1.00
0.00
0.79
0.88
0.23
0.00
0.71
0.84
0.34
0.00
13.14
13.25
2.12
6.40
0.25
0.00
0.43
0.00
0.73
0.14
2.26
-4.40
0.19
0.08
0.24
0.00
0.21
0.11
0.25
0.00
2.58
2.77
0.88
0.00
3.14
3.00
1.90
0.00
0.16
0
0.37
0.00
0.64
1
0.48
0.00
3.01
3.18
0.65
0.00
0.00
0
0.06
0.00
0.00
0
0.06
0.00

9.49
10.54
1.00
1.00
17.32
1.00
24.55
1.00
1.00
4.63
16.00
1.00
1.00
4.26
1.00
1.00
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TABLE 5. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Column 1 presents the regression 1 result on the sample excluding credit-constrained firms and outliers in SSBF 2003 by LR1 as the dependent
variable and DIV as the variable of interest. In column 2, we use DIV2 as the alternative variable of interest. In column 3, we use LR2 as the
alternative dependant variable. Column 4 presents the result of regression 1 on a sub-sample of firms that do not use out-of-firm wealth
collateral, personal guarantees, and co-signers. Column 5 shows the result of regression 1 when we use the increase in sales as the alternative
proxy for growth options. Column 6 shows the result of regression 1 using SSBF 1998 data. Variables are defined in Table 1. Regression 1 is:
LOANS/ASSETSi=B0+B1*DIVi+B2*SIZEi+B3*GROWTH OPTIONSi+ B4*ROAi+B5*TANGIBLE ASSETSi+B6*LIQUIDITY i+B7*NUMBER
OF FSPi+B8*FIRM AGEi+B9*EXPERIENCEi+B10*GENDERi+B11*FOUNDERi+ B12*OWNER BANKRUPTCYi+ B13*FIRM
BANKRUPCTYi +ERRORi
1

6
7
8
9
SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003
SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003 SSBF 2003 SSBF 1998 No Partial # Winsorized Winsorized 50%+ Shares
LR1
DIV

3

4

LR1

LR2

5

LR1

LR1

0.834

0.743

0.862

(13.84)***

(15.61)***

(13.72)***

(8.76)***

(13.85)***

(11.62)***

(10.48)***

0.425

0.438

(12.44)***

(12.49)***

-0.065

-0.092

-0.082

-0.062

-0.041

-0.063

-0.098

-0.118

-0.079

(3.54)***

(1.80)*

(3.50)***

(5.24)***

(6.85)***

(3.27)***

0.020

0.034

0.036

0.047

(0.50)

(0.80)

(0.86)

(0.90)

(5.56)***

(3.65)***

0.034

0.114

(Employment)

(0.79)

(0.82)

(2.01)**

Growth Options

-0.023

(Sales)

(0.68)

Number of FSP.
Firm Age
Experience
Gender
Founder
Owner bankrupt
Firm Bankrupt
Constant

LR1

0.783

0.032

Liquidity

LR1

0.833

(3.60)***

Tangible Assets

LR1

1.117

Growth Options

Profitability

LR1

0.830

DIV2
SIZE

2

-0.036

-0.036

-0.043

-0.036

0.082

-0.040

-0.004

-0.004

-0.043

(2.39)**

(2.45)**

(2.59)**

(2.36)**

(1.59)

(2.64)***

(0.23)

(0.30)

(1.85)*

0.114

0.085

0.141

0.109

0.326

0.131

0.108

0.082

0.200
(1.82)**

(1.53)

(1.13)

(1.37)

(1.47)

(2.62)***

(1.73)*

(1.28)

(0.97)

-0.281

-0.313

-0.385

-0.281

-0.311

-0.274

-0.221

-0.253

-0.293

(2.80)***

(3.11)***

(3.19)***

(2.80)***

(1.18)

(2.68)***

(1.92)*

(2.20)**

(2.42)**

0.044

0.054

0.062

0.046

0.084

0.042

0.055

0.063

0.034

(5.31)***

(6.48)***

(5.80)***

(5.39)***

(1.96)**

(5.32)***

(5.74)***

(6.59)***

(3.36)***

-0.048

-0.063

-0.062

-0.051

-0.053

-0.062

-0.076

-0.087

-0.018

(2.05)**

(2.64)***

(1.98)**

(2.16)**

(1.38)

(2.42)**

(2.34)**

(2.69)***

(0.54)

0.031

0.066

0.050

0.027

0.004

0.033

0.085

0.110

0.043

(0.80)

(1.73)*

(0.94)

(0.70)

(1.31)

(0.84)

(1.90)*

(2.49)**

(0.86)

-0.025

-0.037

-0.041

-0.024

-0.012

-0.026

-0.070

-0.077

0.017

(0.47)

(0.69)

(0.64)

(0.46)

(0.14)

(0.49)

(1.24)

(1.36)

(0.24)

-0.083

-0.078

-0.093

-0.076

-0.103

-0.080

-0.109

-0.104

-0.181

(2.22)**

(2.09)**

(2.12)**

(2.09)**

(1.43)

(2.14)**

(2.64)***

(2.52)**

(3.20)***

-0.357

-0.373

-0.614

-0.361

-0.913

-0.366

-0.502

-0.505

-0.277

(1.70)*

(1.70)*

(2.73)***

(1.73)*

(0.88)

(1.73)*

(2.23)**

(2.21)**

(1.03)

0.237

0.244

0.328

0.228

dropped

0.246

0.056

0.067

0.395

(0.76)

(0.77)

(0.99)

(0.73)

dropped

(0.78)

(0.19)

(0.22)

(0.85)

0.643

1.279

0.833

0.637

0.315

0.657

1.060

1.538

0.787

(2.58)***

(5.75)***

(2.63)***

(2.57)***

(0.93)

(2.58)***

(4.07)***

(6.76)***

(2.41)**

Observations

2091

2091

2091

2091

1319

2055

2233

2233

1284

R-squared

0.11

0.10

0.12

0.11

0.08

0.11

0.109

0.106

0.12

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust t statistics are in parentheses.
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TABLE 6. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS WITH ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES
Table 6 presents the results when we include additional control variables. In column 1, we use DIV as the main
variable of interest. In column 2, we use DIV2 as the alternative variable of interest. Variables are defined in Table 1
and Table 2. Robust t-statistics have been omitted for space reasons.

DIV

1

2

LR1

LR1

0.848***

DIV2
SIZE

0.427**
-0.070***

Growth Options
Profitability

0.035

-0.037**

-0.039**

Tangible Assets

0.148

0.102

Liquidity

-0.258**

-0.294***

Number of FSP

0.044***

0.055***

-0.051*

-0.066**

0.030

0.060

Firm Age
Experience
Gender

-0.025

-0.042

-0.080**

-0.073*

-0.342

-0.354

Firm bankrupt

0.203

0.213

Age

0.025

0.050

Outside Manager

0.020

-0.004

Race

0.040

0.035

Credit Ratings

0.001

-0.001

Firm Delinquency

0.062

0.071

Firm Judgment

0.013

0.018

Owner Delinquency

0.043

-0.028

-0.014

-0.040

Founder
Owner bankrupt

Owner Judgment
Corporate Tax
Service
Retail

0.017

0.007

-0.151***

-0.147**

-0.112**

-0.098*

-0.155***

-0.141**

Utility

-0.096

-0.084

Construction

Wholesale



-0.100***

0.033

-0.064

-0.138

Mining

0.073

0.152

Constant

0.658

1.079

Observations

2091

2091

R-squared

0.117

0.107

Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 7. VIF TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY
Table 7 presents the Variance Inflation Factor test of Regression 1. The highest and average VIF values are 2.46 and
1.01 respectively. The average VIF value is 1.32, which is significantly lower than the common critical value of 5,
suggesting that multicollinearity does not affect the estimation results significantly.
Variable
DIV
SIZE
Growth Options
Tangible Assets
Profitability
Liquidity
Number of FSP
Firm Age
Experience
Gender
Founder
Owner Bankrupt
Firm Bankrupt
Mean VIF

VIF
1.48
2.46
1.09
1.14
1.09
1.32
1.27
1.53
1.59
1.08
1.11
1.01
1.01
1.32

1/VIF
0.674
0.406
0.917
0.876
0.917
0.755
0.786
0.652
0.628
0.929
0.900
0.987
0.989
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TABLE 8. HAUSMAN TESTS ON ENDOGENEITY
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of College is not significant, suggesting that College is not related to the dependent variable other than
through DIV. Column 2 presents the regression result of DIV (the ratio of out-of-firm wealth to total net worth) on College and other control
variables. In Column 3, we obtain the fitted value from Column 2 regression and regress the ratio of total loans to total assets on the fitted value,
DIV, and other control variables. The coefficient of the fitted value is insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that endogeneity does not
significantly affect the estimation result. WLS is a more efficient approach. Column 4, 5, and 6 are the repetitions of Column 1, 2, and 3 using
DIV2 as the alternative variable of interest. Other control variables in the regression are not presented here for simplicity.
Hausman Test Using DIV

1
LR1
DIV

Hausman Test Using DIV2

2

3

4

5

6

DIV

LR1

LR1

DIV2

LR1

0.838

0.838

(13.88)***

(13.88)***

DIV2
College
Fitted values

-0.039

0.033

(1.10)

(3.70)***

0.427

0.427

(12.42)***

(12.42)***

-0.026

0.033

(0.72)

(2.31)**

-1.195

(1.10)
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust t statistics in parentheses

-0.779
(0.72)
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TABLE 9. REGRESSION 2 (TEST ON UNLIMITED LIABILITY FIRMS)
Column 1 shows the estimation result of regression 2 by using the dataset of both limited and unlimited liability firms. The coefficient of
Interaction is positive and significant, suggesting that wealth allocation only affects financial leverage in limited liability firms (ll=1). The
coefficient of DIV is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that wealth allocation does not affect financial leverage in unlimited liability
firms. Column 2 shows the estimation result of regression 1 by using a subset of data that only contains unlimited liability firms. The coefficient
of DIV is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that wealth allocation does not affect financial leverage in unlimited liability firms. This
is consistent with the result in column 1.

DIV
LL

1

2

Pooled

Unlimited

LR1

LR1

0.150

0.168

(0.67)

(0.63)

-0.415
(2.53)**

Interaction

0 .700
(3.33)***

SIZE

-0.049

-0.034

(3.27)***

(1.23)

Growth Options

0.008

-0.067

(Employment)

(0.22)

(0.84)

Profitability
Tangible Assets
Liquidity
Number of FSP.
Firm Age

-0.016

0.001

(1.65)*

(0.07)

-0.013

-0.152

(0.25)

(2.04)**

-0.220

-0.155

(2.84)***

(1.29)

0.058

0.116

(7.03)***

(5.07)***

-0.065

-0.086

(2.74)***

(1.50)

Experience

-0.006

-0.062

(0.18)

(0.98)

Gender

-0.089

-0.146

(2.33)**

(2.71)***

-0.089

-0.102

Founder
Owner bankrupt
Firm Bankrupt
Constant
Observations

(2.64)***

(1.42)

-0.215

-0.187

(1.89)**

(1.85)*

0.352

0.492

(1.46)

(1.41)

0.964

0.906

(3.19)***

(1.88)*

3206

1115

0.08
0.06
R-squared
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust t statistics in parentheses
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Replication of Mueller’s (2008) Results
In Table 10 Column 1, we replicate Mueller’s results. Mueller has 2617 observations in
her sample. We apply the same selection criteria on SSBF 98, such as the exclusion of book
insolvent firms. However, we only obtain a sample of 2434 observations. In Column 2, we show
that there could be better instruments for wealth allocation other than age and gender. Prior
literature has found that women business owners tend to be conservative and avoid using debt
financing (Collerett and Aubry, 1990). Age could also be correlated with leverage through
channels other than wealth allocations. Older people tend to be more financially conservative and
use less leverage than younger ones. Older entrepreneurs are often more reputable than their
younger counterparts because they tend to have been in business longer. Thus, older
entrepreneurs might find it easier to obtain loans. For the above reasons, we argue that gender
and age might not be the best instruments. Column 1 shows the replication results of Mueller
(2008). We obtain results similar to Mueller’s. However, in column 2 we show that there could
be better instruments for wealth allocation (lack of allocations to be exact) than gender and age
because the coefficients of these two variables are significantly related to leverage directly.
Therefore, OLS (or WLS) is a more efficient approach for estimating Regression 1.
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TABLE 10. REPLICATION OF MUELLER’S RESULTS (2008)
In Table 10, Column 1 shows the replication of Mueller (2008). Column 2 shows that gender and age are directly
related to leverage. Therefore, WLS is more efficient than 2-stage-least-squares. lev2 stands for the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets; SNWI stands for the ratio of entrepreneurs’ firm wealth to total net worth; TOTEMP stands
for the natural log of the number of employees; C_FAGE stands for the natural log of firms’ ages in years; sic1-7 are
dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the firm’s SIC code is 1-7 and 0 otherwise; prop is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if the firm is a proprietorship and 0 otherwise; part is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is a
partnership and 0 otherwise; scorp is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is a S-corporation and 0
otherwise; ccorp is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is a C-corporation and 0 otherwise; hispanic is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the owner is Hispanic and 0 otherwise; asian is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if the owner is Asian and 0 otherwise; black is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the owner is Black and 0
otherwise; region 1-8 are dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the firm is located in the region (New England, Mid
Atlantic, East N Central, West N Central, South Atlantic, East S Central, West S Central, Mountain, and Pacific) and
0 otherwise; MSA is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is located in a metro area and 0 otherwise;
highschool is a dummy variable if the owner has a high school degree or above and 0 otherwise; C_EXP is the
owner’s working experience in years; DB_SCORE is D&B credit score rank ranging from the least risky score (1) to
the most risky score (5); U1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firm or its principal owner declared bankruptcy
in the past 7 years and 0 otherwise; ownerdel is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the principal owner has been
delinquent on her personal obligations in the past 60 or more days and 0 otherwise; firmdel is a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 if the firm has been delinquent on its’ obligations in the past 60 or more days and 0 otherwise; U4 is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if judgments have been rendered against the principal owner and 0 otherwise;
length is the number of years that firms have been dealing with its’ current financial service providers; female is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the principal owner is female and 0 otherwise; C_OAGE is the principal owner’s
age in years.
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Table 10
1
Replication
of Mueller
SNWI

2
Hausman
Test

1.002

-0.204

(4.10)***

(7.97)***

female

-0.064
(4.45)***

C_OAGE

-0.003
(4.79)***

TOTEMP
C_FAGE
sic1
sic2
sic3
sic4
sic5

0

0.001

-0.98

(8.55)***

-0.002

-0.002

(2.72)***

(3.79)***

-0.02

0.07

-0.52

(3.13)***

-0.02

0.093

-0.48

(3.44)***

-0.064

0.078

-1.37

(3.06)***

0.004

0.106

-0.07

(3.18)***

-0.026

0.08

-0.82

(4.67)***

sic6

0.041

0.082

-1.1

(2.83)***

sic7

-0.027

0.02

-1.09

-1.17

prop

-0.172

-0.184

(4.44)***

(6.62)***

part

-0.022

-0.063

-0.44

(1.75)*

scorp

-0.002

0.006

ccorp
hispanic

-0.06

-0.21

-0.008

0.013

-0.22

-0.46

-0.009

-0.017

-0.28

-0.72

asian

-0.014

-0.011

-0.41

-0.43

black

-0.046

-0.02

-1.37

-0.81

region1

-0.033

-0.009

-0.72

-0.3

region2

-0.036

-0.008

-1.22

-0.37

region3

0.033

0.034

-1.16

-1.64

region4

-0.047

0.005

-1.44

-0.22

region5

-0.033

-0.007
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Table 10. Continued
-1.25

-0.39

region6

-0.047

-0.008

-1.3

-0.32

region7

-0.037

-0.012

region8
MSA

-1.28

-0.6

-0.03

0.018

-0.84

-0.75

-0.001

-0.034

-0.06

(2.44)**

highschool

0.008

-0.013

-0.15

-0.35

C_EXP

0.002

0.002

(1.96)*

(2.87)***

0.022

0.009

(2.63)***

-1.53

-0.08

-0.07

-1.18

-1.24

-0.07

-0.01

DB_SCORE
U1
ownerdel
firmdel
U4
length
Constant
Observations

(1.92)*

-0.43

0.11

0.129

(3.70)***

(6.40)***

-0.012

0.017

-0.26

-0.55

0

0

(3.15)***

(1.94)*

0.357

0.674

(2.08)**

(4.88)***

2434

2434

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust t statistics in parentheses
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